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ON THE DUALITY OF SOCRATES' WHAT-IS-X QUESTION

John E. T h o m a s
A C C O R D IN G to A ristotle philosophy begins in wonder. As a com panion truth l -one could add -philosophical papers begin in puzzlem ent. This present paper is no exception. In his recent book P lato's " E uth yp h ro " and the Earlier Theory o f F o r m s Professor R. E. Allen takes issue with Professor R ichard Robinson's claim that there is a duality in the W hat-is-X question. 2 The clash between Allen and Robinson furnishes the initial puzzle o f this paper. A ccording to R obinson, S ocrates' W hat-is-X question can be understood either as a request for (1) an identifying m ark of X or (2) the essence o f X. Allen rejects (I) in favour of (2) . In the pages th at follow an attem pt will be m ade to provide an alternative account o f the duality of the W hat-is-X question to R obinson's. The purpose o f this attem p t is to preserve what is valid in R obinson's initial insight (Socrates tolerated other senses o f the question) while siding with A llen's preference for (2) . En route some difficulties of interpreting E uthyphro 6 E are encountered and circum vented.
I
I begin with Professor R obinson's account o f the duality in S ocrates' W hat-is-X question to which Professor Allen takes exception.
(1) On the one hand, m any passages suggest that all he [Socrates] wants is a m ark th a t shall serve as a pattern by which to judge of any given thing w hether it is an X or not. In the E uthyphro (6 E) he describes his aim in ju st this way. 3 (2) In m any oth er passages, however, S ocrates' purpose in asking W hat-is-X ? is evidently not, or not m erely, to distinguish X from everything else. It is to get at what he calls the essence or form of X ...4
The W hat-is-X question, then, m ay be understood either (1) as a request for an identifying m ark of X or (2) as a request for the essence of X.
A ttentive readers of Robinson will notice that the Euthyphro passage is only one o f a num ber cited by Robinson in support o f his claim. Since it would be agreed that these other passages range from P lato 's early middle to late period ‫,-‬ they would not be considered crucial to A llen's case given his special interest in the Euthyphro and P la to 's earlier theory o f Form s. Since Euthyphro 6 E is the bone of contention between Allen and Robinson, I shall concentrate on the problem s of interpretation posed by it.
Allen views (1) as perform ing an evidential role, Euthyphro 6 E is offered by Robinson as evidence for understanding the W hat-is-X question as a request for an identifying m ark.
Allen also credits Robinson with a second " argum ent" for construing the W hatis-X question as a request for an identifying m ark. It runs as follows:
(3) It [that Socrates som etim es seeks an identifying m ark] is suggested again by a word he often used to describe the process o f answering a W hat-is-X ? question, namely horizein. For this term , never losing the feel of its original connection with boundary stones, suggests laying down a m ark to distinguish a field from the next, w ithout in any way describing the soils or the crops in the field so delimited. A nd in P lato 's dialogues the translations " distinguish" and " determ ine" are suitable as often or m ore often than " define" . 6
The relevance of this last passage to E uthyphro 6 E is unclear. Considered in abstracto the horizein " argum ent" fails to buttress R obinson's preference for translating i&ea at 6 E " identifying m a rk " rath er than " essence" . M ore im portantly the term " horizein" does not even occur at 6 E. True, it does occur later at Euthyphro 9D but not in the required sense o f " distinguish" or " determ ine" , but rath er in the sense of " define" . Consequently, I dism iss the horizein argum ent. In fairness to R obinson, however, I should point out th a t m ore weight is placed on the relevance of the horizein passage to Euthyphro 6 E by Allen th at he (R obinson) ever intended it to bear.
The goal Allen sets for him self is the elim ination o f (1) leaving (2) as the only viable sense of the W hat-is-X question. His strategy consists in launching two counter argum ents aim ed respectively at (1) and (3) while sim ultaneously buttressing (2) . I shall try to show th at A llen's purposes m ight have been better served had he sought a different sense for the duality o f the W hat-is-X question rather than concentrating on its elim ination. The attem pt to destroy the duality destroys w hatever is valid in R obinson's claim.
II
In this section, first o f all, I shall exam ine and assess A llen's strategy. This done I shall look m ore closely at R obinson's interpretation of Euthyphro 6 E which triggered A llen's negative response.
F or the reason given A llen's counter argum ent to (3) will be by-passed. I simply concentrate on his attem p t to underm ine ( 1) and establish (2 ). This cryptic rebuttal calls for further elaboration. I take A llen's point to be -if π ο τί is taken to qualify r i s . . . ίσ τιν rath er than iò ta , the possibility o f translating the request as a request for any characteristic w hatsoever is elim inated. Instead the locution την Ιδίαν tìs π ο τί ίσ τιν should be understood to m ean " Teach me with respect to the Ιδία [of holiness] whatever in the world it is" . The stress is placed on elucidating the nature o f Ιδία (w hatever it is) not on offering any characteristic whatsoever. A plea for " any characteristic w hatsoever" would have lent support to R obinson's pitch for rendering iò ta characteristic m ark.
In my opinion, A llen's appeal to the occurrence o f the term π α ρ ά δ ίΐ^μ α at 6 E is not a conclusive reason for rendering Iòta " essence" . To be sure in later dialogues P lato refers to the Form s as standards but, lacking other clues, th at is not a sufficient reason in itself for anticipating later usage in the present context. The term π α ρ ά δ ίΐγ μ α here is som ew hat opaque. Its m eaning will be determ ined once the m eaning o f other term s is fixed.
I
discount also A llen's appeals to adum brations o f " essence" in A ristophanes and X e n o p h o n 8 or to the full blown doctrine in A risto tle. 9 W hether tlòos and Iòta carry the force o f " essence" a t E uthyphro 6 DE is som ething to be determ ined by the context of their occurrence not by appeals to their m eaning in P lato's predecessors a n d /o r contem poraries.
The upshot of these rem arks is to express general sym pathy with A llen's approach but to be m ore selective in sifting the evidence advanced in support of his conclusion. I attach m ore significance to evidence internal to the Euthyphro itself than to the establishm ent o f precedents, anticipations of subsequent usage or even evidence from P la to 's other dialogues as helpful as these often are.
T here are two pieces o f solid evidence internal to the Euthyphro in favour of reading iò ta a t 6 E as a request for " essence" which m ust be taken seriously. First, there is the occurrence o f the technical vocabulary o f the Form s (see αυτό tò tlòos at 6 D and το 'όσων αύτο α ύτψ at 5d). W hat is im p ortant about the occurrence of this technical term inology is th at it is introduced w ithout definition or explanation. A plausible explanation o f this omission is th a t the term s were already fam iliar to P lato 's readers and would be so understood in the passage under consideration. Even m ore im p o rtan t is the occurrence o f the ούσία -πάθος distinction. This distinction certainly presupposes the Form s, and the fact th a t E uthyphro's second definition of piety is rejected because it so obviously falls in the πάθος class of utterances is clear confirm ation th a t P lato 's Socrates is after the essence of piety. One final word about π α ρ ά δ ίΐ^μ α . Once the occurrence of the technical vocabulary of the Form s has been acknowledged and re‫-‬inforced by the occurrence of the ουσία -πάθος distinction it [ π α ρ ά δ ί^μ α ] can be seen to belong to a family o f term s, a decision about the m eaning of one of which is inevitably influenced by the choice of m eaning for the others.
But if things are as clear as 1 have ju st m ade out, it is difficult to explain what could have led Robinson to interpret Socrates' request at 6 E as a request for an identifying m ark of X ? H e nowhere argues for the position. Since, however, such a position has been argued for elsewhere, we shall pause to exam ine it. This digression will serve to illustrate the plausibility o f the view Robinson advances.
A view sim ilar to R obinson's interpretation of tδ ία at Euthyphro 6 E was advanced earlier by Lutoslaw ski. U nlike Robinson, however, Lutoslawski sought (and found) a precedent in earlier Greek literature for rendering ίδ ια and ddos " characte ristic m ark " rather than " essence" . 1 quote Lutoslawski in extenso:
Enum eration of exam ples is shown to be insufficient to give such peynanence to a notion (6 ϋ :ο ύ χ tv τι η δυο των τολλώ ν ύσίων, ά λ Χ ικάνο αυτό τ'ο ei5os, ω ■πάντα τα ίίσια οσιΑ ίσ τιν ) and the characteristic m ark is sought for.
This characteristic m ark is here nam ed d6os, in the sense in which Thucydides used this word when he spoke of an ei!5os νόσον (Thucyd. Lutoslaw ski then acknowledges the difficulty posed by the occurrences o f the term π α ρά δα -γμα at Euthyphro 6 E. The occurrence of this term suggests the " eternal form s or paradigm atic ideas" . We are reassured, however, that in E uthyphro 6 E . . . Plato only speaks of using the characteristic of holiness as a standard for distinguishing holy actions from sinful deeds. Such a use of the word παράδιι~γμα does not essentially differ from that of Thucydides and the early o rato rs. 11 So we are led to understand th at in Thucydides' phrase " eiSos νόσον" , Λδος can be translated " characteristic" or " characteristic m a rk " . A m ore literal rendering would be " sym ptom " (in this case, o f the plague).
To illustrate the difficulty in settling m atters by appeals to precedents, it is interesting to note th a t in the sam e passage A. E. T aylor renders ttio s in tidos νόσον as " real essence" .12 On closer scrutiny Lutoslaw ski's rendition of Λδος νόσου strikes me as being m ore accurate, unless one could m ake a case for the " violence" (χ α λ ίπ ω τίρ ω ς ) o f the attack being constitutive o f its nature. But even if Lutoslawski is correct about the Thucydides passage, it is still debatable w hether this sense properly fits the context o f E uthyphro 6 E. It was precisely this indecisiveness which prom pted me to dow ngrade earlier, A llen's attem pt to discover adum brations of Platonic essence in A ristophanes and Xenophon. Since 1 decried the value of such appeals in considering A llen's position, I cannot consistently now invest them with worth.
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In passing, it is also interesting to note Lutoslaw ski's treatm ent o f ira p a b tiyp a . Just as Allen tended to anticipate later Platonic usage assim ilating the sense of Trapadtiypa to it, so Lutoslaw ski succumbs to the opposite te m p ta tio n ; he assim ulates the m eaning o f w a p a d a y p a to earlier usage giving it a m ore neutral rendition. In both cases the sense is determ ined antecedently to the corroborative evidence. As a procedural ploy, the positing o f senses to determ ine whether the context will accom m odate such conjectures is unobjectionable. W hat is disturbing in this case is th at Allen and Robinson, Lutoslawski and T aylor com e to different conclusions. Hence my preference for assigning g reater weight to the internal evidence o f the E uthyphro than to precedents or anticipations.
But R obinson's failure to back up his rendition o f idea as " identifying m ark " at Euthyphro 6 E is not the only weakness in the position he advances. His account becom es extrem ely confusing when other claim s he m akes are placed alongside (I) and (2) cited in Section I o f this paper.
W hat does one do with lapses into talk about " 'W hat-is-X ' in S ocrates' sense" or with claim s like " The explanations which Socrates gives o f his question provide a context for determ ining this vague form to mean a search for essence as above described." 13 W ell, which is it? Does Socrates speak one way at one time another way at other tim es? Is there a duality in the W hat-is-X question? O r will exam ination of the context o f the question invariably confirm it to be a request for the essence o f X and never a request for an identifying m ark. Is the "Socratic sense" of the W hat-is-X question a request for the essence of X ? N o r does the puzzlem ent end there, for, tow ards the end o f Robinson's chapter on the W hat-is-X question the reader discovers the dem and for an identifying m ark classified as a non-Socratic sense of W hat-is-X -a classification which runs counter to R obinson's initial distinction as exemplified in (1) and (2): W henever a difficulty arises, we interpret the question in some other way to avoid it. F or exam ple, if the conception o f essence becomes m om entarily em barrassing, we tak e W hat-is-X ? as merely a request for identification. Such evasion is always possible because there are several other, non-Socratic senses in which W hat-is-X ? is always a proper question. One o f these is " W hat does the word X m ean?" , the request for verbal definition. A nother is, " Give me a unique designation of X " , the request for a m ark o f identification. A third seems to be, " M ake some true statem ent about X " , for W h at-is-X ? is som etim es as vague as th a t. 14 Robinson cannot have it both ways, cla im in g : (i) both th a t there is a genuine duality in the W hat is X question and that contextual clues reveal th at question to be a request for the essence o f X. 14. Ibid., p. 62.
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X question as a request for an identifying m ark is being totally eclipsed by a preference for treating it as a petition for the essence o f X.
Ill
The previous section left us with R obinson's account in a muddle, though with evidence internal to the E uthyphro tipping the balances in favour of A llen's interpretation of Euthyphro 6 E. The m ost tem pting short-cut to the resolution of the conflict between Allen and Robinson would be a resolution in A llen's favour by dropping the W hat-is-X question as a dem and for an identifying m ark. This solution m ust be resisted for the following reasons. Such a move would be tantam ount to a capitulation on Robinson's p art on the duality of the W hat-is-X question which capitulation would involve the sacrifice of any benefits accruing to the duality. It is not clear from the context of E uthyphro 6 E th at S ocrates' request is to be understood as an unqualified dem and for the essence of X. If it were, how does one account for Socrates' expression o f satisfaction with E uthyphro's second definition of " piety" , a definition rejected by Socrates later? W hile Robinson does not mention this point, it is clearly a problem if we understand the W hat-is-X question as a dem and for the essence of X. As I see it R obinson's translation of iò ta at 6 E is born of a conviction th a t in S ocrates' request there is a plea for som ething less than essence. Minus backing, however, this conviction is difficult to sustain. S ocrates' expression of satisfaction with E uthyphro's answ er could be construed as such backing for R obinson's position. It will, as we shall see, be subject to certain qualifications but R obinson's initial instinct about iò ta at 6 E is sound even if his account of the duality of the W hat-is-X question is faulty. Unless one takes S ocrates' expression of satisfaction as ironic (with all th a t im plies for S ocrates' character), then some oth er way o f resolving the m uddle in R obinson's presentation and of achieving a rapprochem ent between his account and A llen's m ust be undertaken. Given these param eters, w hat is required is a sense for the W hat-is-X question that will (a) preserve its duality and (b) allow us to treat S ocrates' expression o f satisfaction with Euthyphro's second definition as non-ironic, even if not without reservations.
These conditions can be m et by distinguishing between (1) the sense in which S ocrates asks the W hat-is-X question and (ii) the senses in which S ocrates' respondents understand the question and which P la to 's Socrates allows in order to get the conversation moving again along profitable, if not ultim ately acceptable, lines. 15 The qualification " and which Socrates allow s" is crucial, for his permission insures th a t the " other m eanings" of the W hat-is-X question are in a sense Socratic. Socratic in the sense th at they perm itted by him to enable the disputants to m ake fresh headw ay with the conversation ; non-S ocratic in the sense th at they are not what S ocrates is really after.
To be sure, the distinction ju st draw n will be challenged on the grounds th at the 15. A parallel case of Socrates' relaxation of the rigorous sense What-is-X question occurs at M eno 86D. There he permits a shift from " W hat is virtue?" (a request for the essence of virtue) to " Is virtue teachable?" (a secondary question).
bulk o f the answers given to the W hat-is-X question by S ocrates' respondents constitute m isunderstandings. This is not, however, a serious draw back. A fter all, it is Plato who writes the dialogues, with the result that the m isunderstandings are m isunderstandings a consilio. They perform a heuristic function calculated to produce an aw areness, in S ocrates' respondents, o f the culs-de-sac to which their answers lead. Indirectly they also contribute negatively to the discussion by flagging such dead-ends to inquiry. Let us look m ore closely at the application o f distinction just introduced to Euthyphro 6 E. W hen Socrates requests " Teach me with respect to the idea [of piety] whatever it is" . . . Euthyphro replies " W hatever is dear to the gods is pious" . Any interpretation which takes seriously S ocrates' expression o f satisfaction with the answer will have to account for S ocrates' ultim ate rejection of it (1 la) because it falls into the iraeos class o f utterances, which fact whould have been sufficient to disqualify it from the outset. If one regards S ocrates' request as a genuine request for the essence of X and takes seriously his expression o f satisfaction with an answer th at fails to give the essence of X, then a plausible explanation of th at expression o f satisfaction consists in the role played by the answer given in furthering the discussion. If one looks closely at the context o f the second definition of " piety" in the Euthyphro then it will be seen to be clearly an advance over the first. Euthyphro's first response to " W hat is piety" is " Piety is w hat I am doing" . By contrast with the egocentricity implied in ostensive definitions o f this kind, what-is-dear-to-the-gods constitutes a notable advance in generality. Epistem ological difficulties aside, if one could have access to the sentim ents o f the gods, a sentim ent of approval would provide a reliable, if not infallible clue, to the nature o f certain actions. But while the answer m akes an advance in the direction o f generality, it fails to meet a second test, namely, it fails to specify a property intrinsic to piety. In T aylor's words " Thus the form ula does not tell us w hat the character on the ground o f which the gods approve of a certain act is (its oiiffia) but only som ething which happens to these acts, nam ely, th at the gods approve them ; it tells us an affection (it ados) of the 'religious', not its quiddity"
The advantages o f the view advanced here are as follows. First, the preference for translating idea " essence" is tied closely to evidence internal to the Euthyphro. This constitutes a difference in the assessm ent o f the evidence relevant to A llen's conclusion. Next, the distinction introduced in this section provides a sense of " duality" which does justice to a treatm en t of the W hat-is-X question as a request for essence while preserving oth er meanings (contra Robinson) as S ocratic in the sense of being allowed by Socrates to further the argum ent. Finally, the view advanced here allows us to take S ocrates' expression o f satisfaction with Euthyphro's second definition o f " piety" as genuine even if qualified.
I conclude by agreeing with Robinson that there is indeed a duality in the W hatis-X question, one which, if the distinction advanced here is sound, is consistent with Allen's insistence th a t the W hat-is-X question is a dem and for the essence of X. 
